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Abstract We consider the multi-unit random assignment problem in which agents
express preferences over objects and objects are allocated to agents randomly based
on the preferences. The most well-established preference relation to compare random
allocations of objects is stochastic dominance (SD) which also leads to corresponding
notions of envy-freeness, efficiency, and weak strategyproofness. We show that there
exists no rule that is anonymous, neutral, efficient and weak strategyproof. For single-
unit random assignment, we show that there exists no rule that is anonymous, neutral,
efficient and weak group-strategyproof. We then study a generalization of the PS
(probabilistic serial) rule called multi-unit-eating PS and prove that multi-unit-eating
PS satisfies envy-freeness, weak strategyproofness, and unanimity.
Keywords Fair division · probabilistic serial rule · strategyproofness · Pareto
optimality
JEL Classification: C70 · D61 · D71
1 Introduction
In the assignment problem, agents express linear preferences over objects and an ob-
ject is assigned to each agent keeping in view the agents’ preferences. The prob-
lem models one of the most fundamental setting in computer science and eco-
nomics with numerous applications (Ga¨rdenfors, 1973; Wilson, 1977; Young, 1995;
Svensson, 1994, 1999; Bouveret et al., 2010; Abraham et al., 2005). Depending on
the application setting, the objects could be car-park spaces, dormitory rooms, re-
placement kidneys, school seats, etc. The assignment problem is also referred to as
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house allocation (Abraham et al., 2005; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999). If the
outcome of the assignment problem is deterministic then it can be inherently un-
fair. Take the example of two agents having identical preferences over two objects.
Then any reasonable notion of fairness demands that both agents have equal right to
each of the two objects. Since randomization is one of the oldest tools to achieve
fairness, we consider the random assignment problem (Hylland and Zeckhauser,
1979; Young, 1995; Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Katta and Sethuraman, 2006;
Guo and Conitzer, 2010; Bhalgat et al., 2011; Budish et al., 2013) in which objects
are allocated randomly to agents according to their preferences. The outcome is a
random assignment which specifies the probability of each object being allocated to
each of the agents. In contrast to some of the earlier work on random assignment, we
focus on the random assignment problem in which there can be more objects than the
number of agents (Kojima, 2009).
When agents express ordinal preferences over objects but the outcomes are frac-
tional or randomized allocations, then there is a need to use lottery extensions to
extend preferences over objects to preferences over random allocations. In random
settings, the most established preference relation between random allocations is
stochastic dominance (SD). SD requires that one random allocation is preferred to
another one if and only if the former first-order stochastically dominates the latter.
This relation is especially important because one random allocation stochastically
dominates another one if and only if the former yields at least as much expected
utility as the latter for any von-Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility representa-
tion consistent with the ordinal preferences (Aziz et al., 2013c). The SD relation can
be used to define corresponding notions of envy-free, efficiency, and strategyproof-
ness (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Katta and Sethuraman, 2006). In this paper,
we check which levels of fairness, efficiency, and strategyproofness can be satisfied
simultaneously.
For the random assignment problem without multi-unit demands, the most com-
mon and well-known way to assign objects is random priority (RP) in which
a permutation of agents is chosen uniformly at random and agents successively
take their most preferred available object (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998;
Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Cre`s and Moulin, 2001). Although RP is strate-
gyproof and results in a Pareto optimal assignment, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)
in a remarkable paper showed that RP does not satisfy the stronger efficiency notion
of stochastic dominance (SD) efficiency and also a fairness concept called SD-envy-
freeness.1 Furthermore, they presented an elegant algorithm called PS (probabilistic
serial) that is not only SD-efficient and SD-envy-free but also satisfies weak SD-
strategyproofness. In PS , agents ‘eat’ the most favoured available object at the same
rate until all the objects are consumed. The fraction of object consumed by an agent
is the probability of the agent getting that object.2
Since its inception (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001), PS has received consider-
able attention and has been extended in a number of ways (Katta and Sethuraman,
1 Another drawback of RP is that the resultant fractional allocation is #P-complete to com-
pute (Aziz et al., 2013a).
2 By the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, any fractional assignment can be represented by a convex
combination over discrete assignments.
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2006; Athanassoglou and Sethuraman, 2011; Yilmaz, 2009). In particular, it can
be naturally extended to the more general case with multi-unit demands in
which there are nc objects and c ≥ 1 objects are allocated to each of the
agents (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Heo, 2011; Kojima, 2009). The extension
does not require any modification to the specification of PS : agents continue eating
their most preferred available object until all the objects have been consumed. Al-
though this one-at-a-time extension (which we will refer to as OPS ) still satisfies
SD-efficiency and SD-envy-freeness, it is not weak SD-strategyproof (Kojima, 2009).
Incidentally there is another extension of PS called the multi-unit-eating probabilis-
tic serial that was briefly described by Che and Kojima (2010) but has received no
attention in the literature. In multi-unit-eating PS , each agent tries to eat his c most
preferred objects that are still available at a uniform speed until all objects have been
consumed. We show that multi-unit-eating PS satisfies desirable properties: it is weak
SD-strategyproof, SD-envy-free, and unanimous.
We point out that the problem of discrete assignment with multi-unit de-
mands has attracted considerable attention (Bouveret and Lang, 2011; Budish, 2011;
Ehlers and Klaus, 2003; Hatfield, 2009; Kalinowski et al., 2013; Bouveret et al.,
2010). In this paper, we focus on random assignments with multi-unit demands.
Multi-unit demand is a natural requirement in settings such as course alloca-
tion (Budish, 2011). Moreover, we will require that each agents gets equal number
of objects (Hatfield, 2009). This is a natural requirement in settings such as paper
assignment to referees.
Apart from RP and PS , two other natural assignment rules are uniform and prior-
ity. In the uniform rule, each agent gets 1/n of each object (Chambers, 2004; Kojima,
2009). In the priority mechanism, there is a permutation of agents, and each agent in
the permutation is assigned the c most preferred available objects. The priority mech-
anism is also referred to as serial dictator in the literature (Svensson, 1994, 1999).
Whereas uniform does not take into account the preferences of agents and is highly
inefficient, priority is highly unfair to the agents at the end of the permutation. In
more recent work, Nguyen et al. (2015) proposed two mechanisms for the random
assignment problem that also handle limited complementarities. Hashimoto (2013)
presented a generalization of RP for more general settings.
Contributions We first prove that for multi-unit demands, there exists no anonymous,
neutral, weak SD-strategyproof and SD-efficient random assignment rule. The state-
ment is somewhat surprising considering that all the four axioms used in the statement
are minimal requirements. Incidentally, we have not used SD envy-freeness that is of-
ten used to obtain characterizations or impossibility statements in the literature (Heo,
2011; Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Ehlers and Klaus, 2003; Kojima, 2009) and
is a very demanding requirement. The result is then extended to random assignment
without multi-unit demands if requiring weak SD group-strategyproofness instead of
weak SD strategyproofness. Our second result carries over to the setting randomized
voting in which agents express weak orders over alternatives and the outcome is a
lottery over the alternatives.
We then conduct an axiomatic analysis of the multi-unit-eating PS . It is first
highlighted that the definition of multi-unit-eating PS in the literature is not en-
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tirely correct. A proper definition of multi-unit-eating PS is formulated. We show
that for multi-unit demands, in contrast to OPS , multi-unit-eating PS satisfies weak
SD-strategyproofness. We prove that multi-unit-eating PS satisfies SD envy-freeness
which is one of the strongest notions of fairness. On the other hand, multi-unit-eating
PS does not fare well in terms of efficiency. We prove that multi-unit-eating PS
does not even satisfy ex post efficiency although it does satisfy unanimity. There-
fore when we generalize PS for multi-unit demands, OPS is the right extension if
the focus is on efficiency. On the other hand multi-unit-eating PS is the right exten-
sion, if the aim is to maintain weak SD-strategyproofness. The arguments for weak
SD-strategyproofness and SD envy-freeness of MPS multi-unit-eating PS also sim-
plify the proofs for PS for single-unit demands in (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001).
The study helps clarify the relative merits of different assignment rules for multi-unit
demands. The relative merits of prominent random assignment rules are then sum-
marized in Table 1 in the final section.
2 Preliminaries
Random assignment problem The model we consider is the random assignment
problem which is a triple (N,O,%) where N is the set of n agents {1, . . . , n}, O =
{o1, . . . , om} is the set of objects, and %= (%1, . . . ,%n) specifies strict, complete, and
transitive preferences %i of agent i over O. We will assume that m is a multiple of n
i.e., m = nc where c is an integer. We will denote by R(O) as the set of all complete
and transitive relations over the set of objects O.
A random assignment p is a (n × m) matrix [p(i)(o j)]1≤i≤n,1≤ j≤m such that for
all i ∈ N, and o j ∈ O, p(i)(o j) ∈ [0, 1]; ∑i∈N p(i)(o j) = 1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}; and∑
o j∈O p(i)(o j) = c for all i ∈ N. The value p(i)(o j) represents the probability of object
o j being allocated to agent i. Each row p(i) = (p(i)(o1), . . . , p(i)(om)) represents the
allocation of agent i. The set of columns correspond to probability vectors of the
objects o1, . . . , om. A feasible random assignment is discrete if p(i)(o) ∈ {0, 1} for all
i ∈ N and o ∈ O. A random assignment rule specifies for each preferences profile
a random assignment. Two minimal fairness conditions for rules are anonymity and
neutrality. Informally, they require that the rule should not depend on the names of
the agents or objects respectively.
We define the SD (stochastic dominance) relation which is an incomplete re-
lation that extends the preferences of the agents over objects to preferences over
random allocations. Given two random assignments p and q, p(i) %SDi q(i) i.e.,
a player i SD prefers allocation p(i) to allocation q(i) if ∑o j∈{ok :ok%io} p(i)(o j) ≥∑
o j∈{ok :ok%io} q(i)(o j) for all o ∈ O. Since SD is incomplete, it can be that two allo-
cations p(i) and q(i) are incomparable: p(i) SDi q(i) and q(i) SDi p(i).
Next, we define the DL (downward lexicographical) relation which is a complete
relation. Let p(i) and q(i) be two random allocations. Let o ∈ O be the most preferred
object such that p(i)(o) , q(i)(o). Then, p(i) ≻DLi q(i) ⇐⇒ p(i)(o) > q(i)(o).
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Example 1 Consider the random assignment problem for two agents N = {1, 2} and
four objects O = {o1, o2, o3, o4} with the following preferences:
1 : o1, o2, o3, o4
2 : o2, o1, o3, o4
Let us assume that agent 1 gets o1 with probability one, and objects o3 and o4 with
probability half. Then the random assignment can be represented by the following
matrix.
p =
(
1 0 1/2 1/2
0 1 1/2 1/2
)
.
Note that agent 1’s preference is o1 ≻1 o2 ≻1 o3 ≻1 o4. Based on the preferences
over objects, one can consider preferences over allocations: p(1) ≻SD1 p(2) and also
p(1) ≻DL1 p(2).
Envy-freeness An assignment p satisfies SD envy-freeness if each agent (weakly) SD
prefers his allocation to that of any other agent: p(i) %SDi p( j) for all i, j ∈ N. An
assignment p satisfies weak SD envy-freeness if no agent strictly SD prefers someone
else’s allocation to his: ¬[p( j) ≻SDi p(i)] for all i, j ∈ N. For fairness concepts, SD
envy-freeness implies weak SD-envy-freeness (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001).
Economic efficiency An assignment is perfect if each agents gets his most preferred
c objects. An assignment p is SD-efficient is there exists no assignment q such that
q(i) %SDi p(i) for all i ∈ N and q(i) ≻SDi p(i) for some i ∈ N. An assignment is
ex post efficient if it can be represented as a probability distribution over the set of
SD-efficient discrete assignments. Perfection implies SD-efficiency which implies ex
post efficiency.
An assignment rule is SD-efficient (ex post efficient) if it always returns an SD-
efficient (ex post efficient) assignment. An assignment rule satisfies unanimity, if it
returns the perfect assignment if a perfect assignment exists.
SD-efficiency implies ex post efficiency which implies unanimity. The first im-
plication was shown by (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001). For the second implica-
tion, assume that an assignment does not satisfy unanimity, there exists a perfect
assignment p but the mechanism returns some imperfect assignment q. The only SD-
efficient assignment that gives c units to each agent is p. However since q , p, it
cannot be achieved by a probability distribution over SD-efficient discrete assign-
ments.
Strategyproofness A random assignment function f is SD-strategyproof
if f (%)(i) %SDi f (%′i ,%−i)(i) for all %′i and %−i. A random assignment
function f is weak SD-strategyproof if ¬[ f (%′i ,%−i)(i) ≻SDi f (%
)(i)] for all %′i∈ R(O) and %′i∈ R(O)n−1. It is easy to see that SD-strategyproofness
implies weak SD-strategyproofness (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001). A random
assignment function f is weak SD-group-strategyproof if there never exists an
S ⊂ N and %′S∈ R(O)|S | such that f (%′S ,%−S )(i) ≻SDi f (%)(i) for all i ∈ S and
%−S∈ R(O)n−|S |.
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3 General impossibilities
For the random assignment problem for which the number of objects is not more than
the number of agents, there exists a rule (PS ) that is anonymous, neutral, SD-efficient
and weak SD-strategyproof. However when the number of objects is more than the
number of agents, we get the following impossibility (Theorem 1).
Theorem 1 For the random assignment problem with c > 1, there exists no anony-
mous, neutral, SD-efficient, and weak SD-strategyproof rule.
Proof We consider a random assignment setting with two agents and four objects
with the requirement that each agents gets two units of houses.
%1: a, b, c, d
%2: b, c, a, d
%
′
1: b, a, c, d
%
′
2: b, a, c, d
Let us compute f (%1,%′2). By anonymity and neutrality of f
f (%1,%′2) =
(
w x y z
x w y z
)
.
By SD-efficiency of f ,
f (%1,%′2) =
(
1 0 y z
0 1 y z
)
.
By anonymity and neutrality of f ,
f (%1,%′2) =
(
1 0 1/2 1/2
0 1 1/2 1/2
)
.
By using similar arguments, SD-efficiency, anonymity, and neutrality of f implies
that
f (%′1,%2) =
(
1 1/2 0 1/2
0 1/2 1 1/2
)
.
Now let us consider
f (%1,%2) =
(
x11 x12 x13 x14
x21 x22 x23 x24
)
.
For f (%1,%2) to be feasible,
x11, x12, x13, x14, x21, x22, x23, x24 ≥ 0
x11 + x12 + x13 + x14 = 2
x21 + x22 + x23 + x24 = 2
x11 + x21 = x12 + x22 = x13 + x23 = x14 + x24 = 1
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Next, we show that if f (%1,%2) = f (%′1,%2) or f (%1,%2) = f (%1,%′2), then f is
not weak SD-strategyproof.
If f (%1,%2) = f (%′1,%2), then
f (%1,%′2)(2) ≻SD2 f (%1,%2)(2).
Hence, f is not weak SD-strategyproof.
If f (%1,%2) = f (%1,%′2), then
f (%′1,%2)(1) ≻SD1 f (%1,%2)(1).
Hence, f is not weak SD-strategyproof.
Therefore the only way f can still be weak SD-strategyproof if both of the fol-
lowing conditions hold.
– f (%1,%2)(1) is incomparable for 1 with f (%′1,%2)(1).
– f (%1,%2)(2) is incomparable for 2 with f (%1,%′2)(2).
This means that the following constraints should hold.
Given that agent 2 reports %2, agent 1 should not benefit by misreporting %′1
instead of %1. This implies that x11 + x12 + x13 > 1.5.
Given that agent 1 reports %1, agent 2 should not benefit by misreporting %′2
instead of %2. This implies that x22 + x23 + x21 > 1.5.
Adding both these inequalities yields
x11 + x12 + x13 + x22 + x23 + x21 > 3.
But this is a contradiction since x11 + x12 + x13 + x22 + x23 + x21 = (x11 + x21) +
(x12 + x22)+ (x13 + x23) = 3. Hence if f is SD-efficient, and anonymous, neutral, then
it cannot be weak SD-strategyproof.
The same argument can be extended to arbitrary number of agents where each
agent requires two objects from among o1, . . . , o2n. Each new agent i ∈ {3, . . . , n}
most prefers objects o2i−1, o2i and least prefers objects o1, o2, o3, o4. Hence in each
SD-efficient assignment each agent i ∈ {3, . . . , n} is allocated o2i−1 and o2i completely.
The same arguments for the case of two agents apply to the more general case. Sim-
ilarly, the same arguments can also be extended to the case where c > 2. One can
add more objects to end of the preference lists of both agents and each agent gets a
uniform fraction of these objects at the end of the preference lists. ⊓⊔
Theorem 1 complements an earlier impossibility result of Kojima (2009) that
states there exists no SD-efficient, SD envy-free, and weak SD-strategyproof random
assignment rule for multi-unit demands. In Theorem 1, the property of SD envy-
freeness is replaced by anonymity.
The proof above can be extended by cloning agents 1 and 2 to prove the following
statement for the basic assignment setting with single-unit demand.
Theorem 2 For the random assignment problem, there exists no anonymous, neutral,
SD-efficient, and weak SD group-strategyproofness rule even for equal number of
agents and objects.
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Proof We consider a random assignment setting with four agents and fours objects.
There are two agents that are of type 1 and two agents of type 2. Let the real prefer-
ences of the agents {1, 2} of type 1 be %1 and let the real preferences of agents {3, 4}
of type 2 be %2.
%1: a, b, c, d
%2: b, c, a, d
%
′
1: b, a, c, d
%
′
2: b, a, c, d
Let us compute f (%1,%1,%′2,%′2).
By anonymity and neutrality, we know that
f (%1,%1,%′2,%′2) =

w/2 x/2 y/2 z/2
w/2 x/2 y/2 z/2
x/2 w/2 y/2 z/2
x/2 w/2 y/2 z/2
 .
By SD-efficiency, we know that
f (%1,%1,%′2,%′2) =

1/2 0 y/2 z/2
1/2 0 y/2 z/2
0 1/2 y/2 z/2
0 1/2 y/2 z/2
 .
Due to anonymity and neutrality of f ,
f (%1,%1,%′2,%′2) =

1/2 0 1/4 1/4
1/2 0 1/4 1/4
0 1/2 1/4 1/4
0 1/2 1/4 1/4
 .
By using similar arguments, SD-efficiency, anonymity, and neutrality of f implies
that
f (%′1,%′1,%2,%2) =

1/2 1/4 0 1/4
1/2 1/4 0 1/4
0 1/4 1/2 1/4
0 1/4 1/2 1/4
 .
Now let us consider
f (%1,%1,%2,%2) =

x11/2 x12/2 x13/2 x14/2
x11/2 x12/2 x13/2 x14/2
x21/2 x22/2 x23/2 x24/2
x21/2 x22/2 x23/2 x24/2
 .
For f (%1,%1,%2,%2) to be feasible,
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x11, x12, x13, x14, x21, x22, x23, x24 ≥ 0
x11 + x12 + x13 + x14 = 2
x21 + x22 + x23 + x24 = 2
x11 + x21 = x12 + x22 = x13 + x23 = x14 + x24 = 1
Next, we show that if f (%1,%1,%2,%2) = f (%′1,%′1,%2,%2) or f (%1,%1,%2,%2) =f (%1,%1,%′2,%′2), then f is not weak SD group-strategyproof.
If f (%1,%1,%2,%2) = f (%′1,%′1,%2,%2), then
f (%1,%1,%′2,%′2)(3) ≻SD2 f (%1,%1,%2,%2)(3).
Hence, f is not weak SD group-strategyproof.
If f (%1,%1,%2,%2) = f (%1,%1,%′2,%′2), then
f (%′1,%′1,%2,%2)(1) ≻SD1 f (%1,%1,%2,%2)(1).
Hence, f is not weak SD group-strategyproof.
Given that agent of type %2 report %2, then agent of type %1 should not benefit by
misreporting %′1 instead of %1. This implies that x11 + x12 + x13 > 1.5.
Given that agents of type 2 report %1, then agents of type 2 should not benefit by
misreporting %′2 instead of %2. This implies that x22 + x23 + x21 > 1.5.
Hence,
x11 + x12 + x13 + x22 + x23 + x21 > 3
But this is a contradiction since x11 + x12 + x13 + x22 + x23 + x21 = (x11 + x21) +
(x12 + x22) + (x13 + x23) = 3. Hence if f is SD-efficient and anonymous, and neutral,
then it cannot be weak SD group-strategyproof.
The same argument can be extended to arbitrary number of agents. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2 (that holds for single-unit demands) complements Theorem 1 in
(Kojima, 2009) that only holds for multi-unit demands. The assignment problem
in which m = n can be viewed as a subdomain of voting in which each alterna-
tive is a discrete assignment and preferences of an agent over assignments simply
depend on his allocated object (Aziz and Stursberg, 2014). As a corollary of Theo-
rem 2, we get that when agents may express indifference, there exists no random-
ized social choice rule that is anonymous, neutral, SD-efficient, and weak SD group-
strategyproof. This proves a weaker version of the conjecture that there exists no
randomized social choice rule that is anonymous, neutral, SD-efficient, and weak
SD-strategyproof (Aziz et al., 2013b).
We now show that if one of SD-efficiency, anonymity, or weak SD-
strategyproofness is dropped, then there exist rules that satisfy the other properties
mentioned in the two impossibility theorems respectively even for multi-unit
demands. If SD-efficiency is dropped or is replaced by ex post efficiency, then
RP satisfies strategyproofness, anonymity, neutrality and ex post efficiency. If
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anonymity is dropped, then the priority mechanism achieves SD-efficiency and group
SD-strategyproofness. If weak SD-strategyproofness is dropped, then OPS satisfies
the other properties. It remains open whether neutrality is necessarily required to
obtain the two impossibility theorems.
4 Multi-unit-eating PS
In this section, we examine the properties satisfied by multi-unit-eating PS (MPS ).
Before we proceed, we will try to get a better understanding of how multi-unit-
eating PS works. Che and Kojima (2010) defined multi-unit-eating PS as the rule
in which each agent eats his c most preferred objects at speed 1 during the time in-
terval t ∈ [0, 1]. They assumed that at each point each agent has c objects available
for consumption during the running of multi-unit-eating PS and hence all the objects
are consumed at time 1. We first show that it may be the case that less than c objects
are available for consumption. Consider the illustration of multi-unit-eating PS in
Figure 1. At time t = 7/8, only o4 is remaining. Hence the first goal is to decide how
to define multi-unit-eating PS when agents have less than c objects to eat. We resort
to the following definition of multi-unit-eating PS .
Let rem(t) be the number of objects that have not been completely eaten at
time t. In multi-unit-eating PS , each agent eats his min(c, rem(t)) most pre-
ferred available objects with speed 1 at every time point until all the objects
have been consumed.
0 1/2 9/817/83/4
Agent 1
Agent 2
o1, o2
o3, o2
o1, o3
o3, o4
o1, o4
o1, o4
o4
o4
o4
o4
1 : o1 , o2 , o3, o4
2 : o3 , o2 , o4, o1
p =
(
3/4 1/2 1/4 1/4
1/4 1/2 3/4 3/4
)
.
Fig. 1 Illustration of multi-unit-eating PS with agents eating their preferred objects over time. The even-
tual assignment is p.
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We will use MPS as the abbreviation for multi-unit-eating PS . Our first obser-
vation is that even though agent may not necessarily eat c objects at each point, each
agent eats the same number of objects.
Observation 1 At each time point, each agent is consuming the same number of
objects. All the agents stop eating at exactly the same time.
If the number of objects is less than c, then we know that only c′ < c objects are
remaining. Next, we study properties of multi-unit-eating PS . The first things to ob-
serve is that multi-unit-eating PS runs in linear time and results in a unique fractional
assignment. We examine various axiomatic properties of multi-unit-eating PS . Our
main findings are summarized in the following theorem. We will prove these proper-
ties in a series of propositions.
Theorem 3 Multi-unit-eating PS is linear-time, SD envy-free, weak SD-
strategyproof, and unanimous but not ex post efficient.
4.1 Fairness
We first show that multi-unit-eating PS satisfies all the notions of fairness defined
in the preliminaries. It is easy to see that multi-unit-eating PS is anonymous and
neutral. Next we show that multi-unit-eating PS is SD envy-free. For the proof, we
use an extra bit of notation. For each set S ⊆ O, let the characteristic vector of S be
ˆS = (x1, . . . , xm) where xi = 1 if i ∈ S and xi = 0 if i < S .
Proposition 1 Multi-unit-eating PS is SD envy-free.
Proof When multi-unit-eating PS is run, if at least one of the c most preferred avail-
able objects of some agent i ∈ N is finished, agent i starts eating the next most pre-
ferred c available objects. Also note that when an agent cannot consume more units of
an object, then no agent can consume more units of the object either. We will refer to
such a time-point as a breakpoint. The breakpoints are t1, . . . , tl. Let pk be the partial
assignment at breakpoint tk. We prove by induction over k, the number of breakpoints
in the algorithm, that for each agent i ∈ N, his partial allocation pk(i) %SDi pk( j) for
all j ∈ N.
For the base case k = 1, we know that p1(i) %SDi p1( j) for all j ∈ N since
each agent i was consuming his most preferred c objects. Now let us assume that
pk(i) %SDi pk( j). We show that pk+1(i) %SDi pk+1( j). At time tk, let the number of
objects that have not been completely even be c′ ≤ c. Let us consider the time point
tk + δ for some arbitrarily small δ > 0. From time point tk to tk + δ each agent i
consumes δ amount of c′ most preferred objects of S ⊂ O for which δ amount is still
available. Thus pk(i) is changed to pk(i) + δ( ˆS ). In the meanwhile for each j, p( j) is
changed to pk( j) + δ( ˆS ′) where S ′ consists of c′ most preferred objects for which δ
amount is still available. Hence, pk+1(i) %SDi pk+1( j) for each i, j ∈ N. ⊓⊔
Corollary 1 Multi-unit-eating PS is weak SD envy-free. Moreover, for the assign-
ment problem without multi-unit demands, PS is SD envy-free.
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4.2 Strategyproofness
In this subsection, we examine the strategic aspects of multi-unit-eating PS . We
show that multi-unit-eating PS satisfies DL-strategyproofness and hence weak SD-
strategyproofness. A random assignment function f is DL-strategyproof if f (%
)(i) %DLi f (%′i ,%−i)(i) for all %′i∈ R(O) and %′i∈ R(O)n−1.
Lemma 1 DL-strategyproofness implies weak SD-strategyproofness.
Next we show that multi-unit-eating PS is DL-strategyproof. The key to our ar-
gument is the insight that an agent cannot get an object with probability one if he
does not start eating it from time t = 0. This contrasts sharply with one-at-a-time PS
where an agent can still get an object completely even if he delays eating it.
Lemma 2 An agent cannot get an object o completely if he does not express it as one
of his most preferred c objects.
Proof Assume that agent i does not report o as one of his most preferred c objects
but gets it completely. Then while i is eating o, there must be at least c+1 objects that
are still not eaten completely and none of the other agents are eating o. Before agent
i eats o, the number of units eaten by i is at least 1 and less than c. If i has already
eaten exactly c units, then it will get zero units of o. Now for the c objects it starts
eating including o, it can eat at most c − 1 units because it has already eaten at least
one unit. Therefore, agent i can eat at most (c − 1)/c of o. ⊓⊔
Proposition 2 Multi-unit-eating PS is DL-strategyproof.
Proof We show that for each agent i ∈ N, MPS (N,O, (%i,%−i))(i) %DLi
MPS (N,O, (%′i ,%−i))(i) for all other preferences %′i∈ R(O) and %−i∈ R(O)n−1. If
agent i misreports but eats the same objects at each time point, then i gets exactly
the same allocation. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that i gets a less preferred al-
location with respect to DL if he does not eat the most preferred available objects
at each point. Consider the untruthful report ≻′i under which at some breakpoint t,
agent i eats a different set of min(c, rem(t)) objects than when he reports ≻i. Consider
the most preferred object o that i started eating at time t when he was reports ≻i but
does not eat when he reports ≻i. This means that for all o′ ≻i o, agent i gets exactly
the same units of o′ when he reports ≻i or when he reports ≻′i . Since i does not eat
o at time t when he reports ≻′i , he eats it at a time later than t. We can assume that
rem(t) > c or else agent i will eat the same objects after time t whether he reports ≻i
or ≻′i . We show that i gets strictly less fraction of o when he reports≻
′
i . We distinguish
between two cases: (1) when i eats o when he reports ≻′i , there is at least one other
agent j that also eats o at some point. (2) when i eats o when he reports ≻′i , there is at
least one other agent j that also eats o at some point. In case of (1), o′ is in demand
and i could have eaten a bigger portion of o had he started eating it earlier such as
time t. In case of (2), no agent started eating o at any time point when i reports ≻′i .
This implies that i gets o completely. But this is a contradiction because we proved
in Lemma 2 that if an agent does not start eating an object at time 0, then he cannot
eat it completely. ⊓⊔
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The proposition implies that Multi-unit-eating PS is weak SD-SP. As a corollary
we also get that for m = n, the original PS is weak SD-strategyproof. Our proof
simplifies the argument in (Step 2, Proposition 1, Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001).
Note that Proposition 2 crucially depends on the fact that in MPS, each agent
tries to eat his c most preferred objects. If each agent eats c − 1 most preferred ob-
jects, then we already know from (Kojima, 2009), that the rule is then not even weak
SD-strategyproof. We note that in contrast to Multi-unit-eating PS , OPS is not DL-
strategyproof and in fact there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a
DL best response (Aziz et al., 2015).
4.3 Efficiency
We now consider efficiency of multi-unit-eating PS . We first observe that multi-unit-
eating PS satisfies unanimity.
Proposition 3 Multi-unit-eating PS satisfies unanimity.
Proof A preference profile admits a perfect assignment only if each agent can get
his most preferred c objects. This implies that for any two agents, their sets of c
most preferred objects don’t intersect. Given this condition, multi-unit-eating PS will
assign each agent with his most preferred c objects. ⊓⊔
Although unanimity is a very undemanding efficiency property, not all assignment
rules satisfy unanimity. For example, the uniform rule does not satisfy it. Even if
multi-unit-eating PS is modified slightly so that agents eat their c + 1 most preferred
objects at the same rate, then the modified rule would not satisfy unanimity. We also
note that the allocation of each agent via multi-unit-eating PS is SD-preferred over
the uniform allocation.
Proposition 4 For each agent i ∈ N, i SD-prefers his allocation returned by multi-
unit-eating PS to the uniform allocation.
Informally, an agent gets his worst possible assignment if all the other agents
have the same preferences. Even in this case, each agent gets a uniform allocation.
Although, multi-unit-eating PS satisfies unanimity, an assignment returned by multi-
unit-eating PS can be represented as a convex combination of Pareto dominated dis-
crete assignments.
Proposition 5 There exists a preference profile for which the outcome of multi-unit-
eating PS can be represented as a probability distribution over Pareto dominated
discrete assignments.
Proof Consider two agents having the following preferences.
1 : o1, o2, o3, o4
2 : o2, o1, o4, o3
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The random assignment as a result of multi-unit-eating PS is
(
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
)
which can be represented by a probability distribution over the following discrete
assignments.
1
2
(
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
)
+
1
2
(
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
)
.
It can be shown that both discrete assignments are not SD-efficient. ⊓⊔
Corollary 2 Multi-unit-eating PS is not SD-efficient.
Proof An SD-efficient assignment cannot be represented as a convex combination of
discrete assignment in which at least one of the assignments is not SD-efficient. If
this were the case, then the random assignment is not SD-efficient. ⊓⊔
Although the lack of SD-efficiency of multi-unit-eating PS was commented on in
the original paper of Che and Kojima (2010), we show that multi-unit-eating PS is
surprisingly not even ex post efficient.
Proposition 6 Multi-unit-eating PS is not ex post efficient even if we allow convex
combinations of all deterministic assignments including unbalanced deterministic
assignments.
Proof Consider two agents having the following preferences.
1 : o1, o2, o3, o4
2 : o3, o2, o4, o1
A discrete assignment is not SD-efficient if agent 1 gets o3 or o4
and agent 2 gets o1. The only SD-efficient discrete assignments are(
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
)
,
(
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
)
,
(
1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1
)
,
(
1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
)
,
(
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
)
and
(
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
)
. We note that
the outcome of multi-unit-eating PS is p =
(
7/8 4/8 2/8 3/8
1/8 4/8 6/8 5/8
)
. Now if random
assignment p is ex post efficient, then it can be expressed as a convex combination of
SD-efficient feasible discrete assignments. Since p(2)(o1) > 0, this is only possible if(
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
)
is used in the convex combination. But since agent 2 does not get o1 in any
other discrete permutation, this means that if any convex combination of SD-efficient
discrete assignments is used to obtain p, then in each discrete SD-efficient assignment
used the following three cases can occur: (i) 2 gets both o2 and o1; (ii) 2 gets neither
o2 nor o1 and (iii) 2 gets o2 but not o1. Hence, it must be that p(2)(o2) ≥ p(2)(o1).
But this is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
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Uniform Priority RP OPS MPS
SD-efficiency - + - + -
ex post efficient - + + + -
unanimity - + + + +
SD envy-freeness + - - + +
weak SD envy-freeness + - + + +
anonymous + - + + +
neutrality + + + + +
SD-SP + + + - -
DL-SP + + + - +
weak SD-SP + + + - +
polynomial-time + + - + +
Table 1 Assignment rules for allocating multiple objects to agents with strict preferences. Most of the
properties of rules other than MPS are stated in Kojima (2009).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we showed a general impossibility result concerning randomized as-
signment with multi-unit demands. Another impossibility result requiring weak SD-
group-strategyproofness applies to randomized assignment without multi-unit de-
mands. As a corollary of the second impossibility, we also obtain the corresponding
impossibility in the domain of randomized voting.
We then presented a definition of multi-unit-eating PS . Multi-unit-eating PS has
previously only been defined inaccurately in the literature. We showed that whereas
multi-unit-eating PS satisfies some compelling fairness and strategic properties, it
does not satisfy reasonable efficiency requirements. We note that the positive results
of Multi-unit-eating PS even hold if m is not a multiple of n. In this case, agents eat
a maximum of ⌈m/n⌉ houses at any time.
Our findings concerning multi-unit-eating PS are summarized in Table 1 which
also provides a comparison with other random assignment rules. In view of the im-
possibility result (Theorem 1), it is not possible to achieve the desirable properties of
PS and multi-unit-eating PS simultaneously. It is easy to see that the choice of an
assignment rule depends on which properties are prioritized. Our paper helps clar-
ify the relative merits of various randomized assignments rules. It is an open prob-
lem whether ex post efficiency, weak SD-strategyproofness and SD envy-freeness are
compatible in the multi-unit case. We leave a characterization of multi-unit-eating
PS for future work.
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